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1A Drone by Any Other Name:  
Purposes, End-User Trustworthiness, and  
Framing, but not Terminology,  
Affect Public Support for Drones  
Lisa M. PytlikZillig, Brittany Duncan,  
Sebastian Elbaum, and Carrick Detweiler     
Projections indicate that, as an industry, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly known as drones) could bring more than 100 
000 jobs and $80 billion in economic growth to the U.S. by 2025 [1]. 
However, these promising projections do not account for how various 
publics may perceive such technologies. Understanding public percep-
tions is important because the attitudes of different groups can have 
large effects on the trajectory of a technology, strongly facilitating or 
hindering technology acceptance and uptake [2]. 
To advance understanding of U.S. public perceptions of UAV tech-
nologies, we conducted a nationwide survey of a convenience sample 
of 877 Americans recruited from Amazon’s pool of Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) workers. In our surveys, we used short scenarios to exper-
imentally vary UAV characteristics, the end-users of the technology, 
and certain communication factors (terminology and framing). This 
allowed us to investigate the impacts of these factors alone and in 
combination. 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
Published in IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 2 March 2018, pp 80-91.
DOI 10.1109/MTS.2018.2795121 
Copyright 2018 IEEE; used by permission.
Pytl ikZ ill ig  et  al .  in  IEEE  Technolo gy  and  So c iety  Magaz ine  (2018)       2
In addition, given the conflicts that sometimes arise around sci-
entific findings and technologies (e.g., climate change, vaccines, [3], 
[4]), we also gave explicit attention to whether and how public sup-
port for UAVs varied by self-reported political ideology, issue atti-
tudes, and perceptions of end-user trustworthiness. Finally, because 
UAVs for civilian purposes represented relatively new technologies at 
the time of the first survey, we examined whether public opinion is 
changing over time, as more people become aware of UAVs. We thus 
administered the same survey twice, separated by one year, in the fall 
of 2014 and 2015. 
The results of our experimental manipulations revealed a surpris-
ing lack of impact of terminology and UAV autonomy, a small impact 
of message framing and UAV end-user, and a relatively large impact 
of UAV purpose. We did not find that public attitudes changed much 
over the year between samples, and perceptions of end-user trust-
worthiness were strong predictors of public support. Still, our regres-
sion models only accounted for about 40% of the variance in public 
support, suggesting that additional variables should be studied in fu-
ture work to gain a more complete understanding of public support 
for UAVs. We also found evidence of a small amount of political polar-
ization of public opinion related to who was using the UAVs for what 
purpose, and this polarization appeared to be changing over time. 
Taken together, our results — which may be especially useful to UAV 
designers, marketers, and policy makers — suggest there is a need to 
establish that the UAVs are used for valued purposes and by users that 
publics find to be trustworthy. However, public judgments might be 
significantly impacted by personal or local ideologies rather than na-
tional priorities. In the next section, we describe in more detail prior 
research on public support for UAVs, and how we formulated our re-
search questions and hypotheses. We then describe our methods, re-
sults, and findings in greater detail. 
Background and Research Questions 
In this research, our primary interest was to advance understanding 
of factors that impact public support — potentially including politi-
cally polarized support — for UAVs in the U.S. Some of our research 
questions were derived from questions facing professionals designing 
Pytl ikZ ill ig  et  al .  in  IEEE  Technolo gy  and  So c iety  Magaz ine  (2018)       3
UAVs, such as, does it matter what the technologies are called? Other 
questions were inspired by prior social science findings, for instance, 
how easy is it to evoke political polarization in response to UAVs? 
Communicating about UAVs: Terminology and Framing 
Some UAV industry professionals, concerned about how terminology 
might impact public perceptions, have tried to persuade the U.S. me-
dia to stop calling the technology “drones.” Their concern is that the 
word “drone” evokes negative visions — perhaps of large predatory 
war instruments unthinkingly and unapologetically completing their 
missions without regard for collateral damage [5]. 
Social science theory and research also suggests that the terminol-
ogy used to describe objects can influence people’s perceptions. Euphe-
mistic labeling refers to how different terms (e.g., military force vs. 
war; collateral damage vs. innocent victims) impact people’s responses 
Figure 1. Photograph of the water sampling UAV in the field (not 
shown to participants).   
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to verbal descriptions of events and objects [6], [7]. In general, lan-
guage does matter, and different terms and phrases often are associ-
ated with different emotions and cognitive associations [8]. Although 
a prior study found terminology had little or no effect on public atti-
tudes toward drones [9], that study was conducted in Australia and 
it is unclear whether the findings will generalize to the U.S. On the 
other hand, we might expect terminology to have no effect in the U.S. 
because the term “drones” has been commonly used by the media and 
others when referring to commercial applications of the technologies, 
thereby potentially reducing the association between the term “drone” 
and military activity. 
Even if terminology does not affect public perceptions, other com-
municative factors may. A particularly common finding in the social 
sciences is that humans tend to be more strongly motivated to avoid 
losses or prevent harm than to approach gains or promote benefits 
[10], [11]. For example, very different levels of support are offered 
when inquiring about “saving lives” (a benefit) versus “preventing 
deaths” (a harm)—with people generally more supportive of efforts to 
prevent deaths than to save lives [10]. If this framing effect applies to 
the current context, framing of UAVs in terms of harms they can pre-
vent should result in more support than framing them in terms of ben-
efits they might promote. Some research, however, suggests that opin-
ions are less susceptible to framing effects when people have thought 
more deeply and analytically about the issues [12], [13]. Thus, if fram-
ing effects are not found, or are found but appear to be decreasing 
over time, this could indicate that the public is forming more robust 
opinions that are less influenced by communication factors. In lieu of 
any prior evidence or significant event occurring between surveys, we 
had no reason to expect that the framing effects would not occur or 
would change over time. Thus, our first research question (RQ) and 
hypothesis (H) is as follows: 
○  RQ1: Is public support impacted by communicative factors such 
as terminology describing the technology and/or promotion 
and prevention framing, and do these impacts change over 
time? 
○  H1: Consistent with prior research, terminology will have no im-
pact on public support, but framing will have a significant im-
pact favoring prevention framing that is consistent over time. 
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UAV Autonomy 
We also examined the effect of UAV autonomy on U.S. public support. 
The effect of the autonomy of UAVs on public support has been studied 
in the context of military drones, where the primary ethical concerns 
are related to risk of collateral damage and the use of conscience-free 
weapons making life-and-death decisions [14], [15]. The autonomy of 
other technologies has also raised public concern — for example, the 
public has been leery of self-driving cars [16]. UAV autonomy has been 
less studied in the context of civilian uses. We sought to fill that gap 
by examining autonomy as it relates to different UAV purposes. We 
hypothesized that autonomy will matter less in domains where auto-
mation increases efficiency and reliability without raising clear ethi-
cal concerns. For example, many have suggested that economic topics 
like budgeting and taxes are less relevant to people’s moral and ethical 
concerns than life and death topics like abortion and the death pen-
alty (see review in [17]). Wariness of self-driving cars could also be 
related to fears about deaths and injuries. In the context of security 
and defense, respondents might imagine the UAVs autonomously do-
ing harm. However, UAV autonomy may be less related to public sup-
port when UAVs are used for economic or environmental goals. Thus, 
our second research question and hypothesis is: 
○  RQ2: Does autonomy of the UAVs affect public support (and/or 
does it depend on the purpose of the UAVs)? 
○  H2: Autonomy will have a negative influence on support in the 
context of using UAVs for security, but will have less or no in-
fluence in the context of using UAVs for economic or environ-
mental purposes. 
UAV Purpose, Perceptions of the UAV End-User, and Political 
Polarization 
Prior studies suggest UAV purposes influence attitudes towards 
UAVs, in both the U.S. and elsewhere [18]. U.S. public opinion is 
rather positive in the context of military [19], [20] and security 
[21], [22]. Further, polls suggest the U.S. public supports UAV use 
for search and rescue and scientific research purposes, while being 
less favorable toward every day commercial uses such as package 
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delivery or local law enforcement (e.g., crowd monitoring and crime 
detection) [23]. 
However, the extent to which public attitudes toward UAVs are or 
may be becoming politically polarized has been given only scant atten-
tion to date [23]. Such investigations are important given the manner 
in which public polarization has impacted progress related to other 
science and technologies. For example, public responses to genetically 
modified foods was quite different in the Europe versus the U.S. [24]. 
We explored the possible provocation of political polarization 
around UAVs in two ways: First, we explicitly tied certain UAV capa-
bilities to commonly studied political issues (e.g., water sampling in 
the service of environmental conservation, or using commercial UAVs 
to build a strong economy). Second, we varied the actor using the UAV 
(i.e., public or private domain). There are political differences in atti-
tudes toward business versus governmental actors in different situa-
tions. For example, self-identified conservatives generally favor free 
market forces over governmental involvement, and [25] found that 
conservatives report less trust in government than liberals. Yet greater 
trust in government has been found among conservatives when con-
sidering foreign rather than domestic policy [26], and conservatives 
may support government involvement when it comes to security and 
defense [27]. These results suggest that UAV purpose and end user 
need to be considered in combination. 
Related to the experimental variation of UAV purposes and end us-
ers, we also assessed issue attitudes (toward environmental, security 
and economic issues) and perceptions of end-user trustworthiness. 
Miethe et al. [23] suggest that, among other factors, distrust of ac-
tors using the UAVs may have resulted in low support for use of UAVs 
for crowd monitoring or use near one’s home. Including measures of 
issue attitudes and actor trustworthiness allowed us to test whether 
any differences related to actor, or actor and purpose were due to dif-
ferences in such attitudes. Our final research questions and hypoth-
eses were as follows: 
○  RQ3: What are the most important factors affecting public sup-
port for UAV development and use (and did these factors 
change from 2014 to 2015)? 
○  H3: Consistent with prior research, the purpose of UAVs will 
be among the most important predictors across both 2014 
and 2015. 
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○  RQ4: What conditions, if any, appear to elicit politically polar-
ized responses (and did these conditions change from 2014 to 
2015)? 
○  H4: Polarized support will be dependent upon both the pur-
pose of UAVs and the actor using them, with heightened po-
larization apparent when UAVs are used to address polariz-
ing issues (e.g., the environment) and used by end users that 
are differentially trusted dependent upon ideology (e.g., the 
government). 
Methodology 
Study Design 
To investigate our research questions, we used a “vignette survey ex-
periment” [28] administered to a convenience (i.e., not representa-
tive) sample comprised of U.S. Amazon MTurk workers. After ask-
ing whether participants had heard of the technology, the survey 
presented each participant with a brief definition of the technology 
and then provided a short scenario depicting an agency investigating 
possible future uses of UAVs. Features of the scenario were manip-
ulated in a fully-crossed design. Table 1’s first row depicts the tem-
plate used to develop the scenarios. Instances of each item (italicized 
within brackets) were selected dependent upon randomly assigned 
condition from the corresponding categories in the Table. 
Measures 
Immediately following the experimentally manipulated scenario, we 
assessed our primary dependent measure, support for the UAVs, and 
measured perceptions of the trustworthiness, competence, and dis-
trustworthiness of the end user. Our three trust-relevant variables 
(hereafter referred to collectively as measures of trustworthiness) 
were determined based on theory and preliminary factor analyses 
[29]. As shown in Table 2, we averaged across multiple items to cre-
ate internally reliable scales with Cronbach alpha values greater than 
or equal to 0.7, as is commonly recommended. 
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Table 1. Manipulations of conditions within the vignette survey experiment. 
Imagine that… For the next questions, imagine that [Public/private] has established [Agencies] that is investigating the use of  [Tech-
nology] to [Purpose1]. For example, the [Public/private] might [Purpose2]. The [Technology] they are using are [Autonomy]. 
Public/Private  The U.S. government  A private U.S. company 
Agencies  Public/Government  Private/Business 
Economic  A new Institute of Economic Development  An Economic Development Research Unit 
Environment  A new Institute of Environmental Enhancement  An Environmental Enhancement Research Unit 
Security  A new Institute of Public Safety and Security  A Public Safety and Security Research Unit 
Technology  Drone(s)                              Aerial robot(s)  Unmanned aerial             Unmanned aerial 
   vehicle(s) — UAV(s)          system(s) — UAS(s) 
Purposes  Promotion Focus  Prevention Focus 
Economic  1) [Technology] used to promote economic  1) [Technology] used to prevent economic  
  growth   decline
 2) [for example] to be used to make tasks  2) [for example] to be used to make tasks such 
	 	 such	as	package	delivery	more	efficient,		 	 as	package	delivery	more	efficient,	possibly 
  possibly allowing business owners to   allowing business owners to cut losses and 
	 	 expand	their	businesses	and	profits	and		 	 costs	and	avoid	business	closures,	thereby 
  become more competitive, thereby   helping the U.S. economy to remain stable. 
  improving the U.S. economy. 
Environment  1) [Technology] used to discover or create  1) [Technology] used to monitor and 
  additional natural resources in our country   protect natural resources in our country
 2) [for example] to be used to gather water  2) [for example] be used to gather water samples 
  samples in order to discover and document   in order to detect water quality problems, 
  clean water sources, or other sources of   or other threats to valuable natural resources. 
  valuable natural resources. 
Security  1) [Technology] used to promote public  1) [Technology] used to prevent public 
	 	 confidence	in	everyday	security		 	 concerns	about	everyday	security
 2) [for example] to be used to actively seek out  2) [for example] to help monitor and prevent 
  illegal activities, potentially allowing for the   harm from illegal activities, potentially 
  prosecution and punishment of a greater   allowing the prevention of increases 
  number of crimes happening on U.S. soil,   in crimes happening on U.S. soil. 
  resulting in increases in public safety.   
Autonomy  Fully autonomous —  Partially autonomous — Not autonomous — 
 meaning that they are entirely  meaning that they are controlled  meaning that they are entirely 
 controlled by computers that have  both by computers that have been manually controlled by people 
 been programmed to guide their  programmed to guide their actions with remote controls that have  
 actions. Human manual control is  and manually by humans trained been trained to guide the 
 not used.  to control them remotely.  [Technology]’s actions.  
   Computer automated controls  
   are not used.    
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Near the end of the survey we assessed demographics such as age, 
gender, and ethnicity. We also assessed scenario-specific issue atti-
tude (e.g., I believe [the protection of our environmental resources; 
U.S. national security; a strong U.S. economy] should be the nation’s 
top priority) with response options ranging from strongly disagree 
(1) to strongly agree (7). Political ideological identity was assessed as 
the average across three items asking participants to rate the extent 
to which they were strongly liberal (1) to strongly conservative (7) on 
economic issues, social issues, and overall (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91). 
Participants 
A total of 576 participants were recruited in late 2014 and 301 in late 
2015 via MTurk. All participants were American citizens and were 
paid 25 cents (0.25 USD) in 2014 or 50 cents (0.5 USD) in 2015. As 
is common with MTurk, both samples, on average, self-reported they 
Table 2. Measures of support for UAVs and end-user trustworthiness. 
Subscale  Item  Response Scale  Cronbach’s alpha 
    (internal consistency) 
Support for UAV Use  To what extent do you approve of [Actor]  Strongly Disapprove (1) 0.93 
 using [Technology] for the purposes described  to Strongly Approve (7)  
 above? 
 To what extent would you support or resist [Actor]  Strongly Resist (1) to 
 use of [Technology] for the purposes described above?  Strongly Support (7)
 For example, how willing would you be to vote to  
 allow such uses or have public funds promote such uses? 
Below, indicate your opinions about how [Actor] would behave when using [Technology] for the purposes described above. 
Trustworthiness		 Only	use	the	[Technology]	to	benefit	the	public	at	large		 Never	(1)	to	Always	(6)		 0.87	
	 Be	honest	with	the	public	about	anything	they	find	or	 
    do using the [Technology] 
 Be transparent (open) about how, when, and why  
    they are using the [Technology] 
 Use the [Technology] to achieve values important to you 
Distrustworthiness		 Use	the	[Technology]	for	their	own	selfish	benefit		 Never	(1)	to	Always	(6)	 0.85	
	 Be	dishonest	about	anything	they	find	or	do	 
    using the [Technology] 
 Hide information about how, when and why they  
    are using the [Technology] 
 Use [Technology] to support values that you 
    disagree with 
Competence		 Be	competent	in	their	use	of	[Technology]		 Never	(1)	to	Always	(6)	0.70	
 Be incompetent in their use of [Technology] (reversed)    
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were somewhat more liberal than conservative (see Figure 2). In 
2014, there were slightly more men than women (299 versus 277) and 
slightly more women than men in 2015 (167 versus 134). The samples 
were of a similar age distribution with 2014 having a mean age of 36.2 
years (SD: 12.8) and 2015 having a mean age of 36.6 years (SD: 12.3). 
Results 
The data were analyzed using the Statistical Program for Social Sci-
ences (IBM SPSS Statistics 23). To answer our research questions and 
test our hypotheses, we conducted correlation and multiple regres-
sion analyses. 
Correlation analyses allow us to examine the strength of the rela-
tionship between any two variables. As shown in Table 3, among the 
experimentally varied factors, the highest correlations and thus the 
strongest relationships with support involved UAV purpose. The neg-
ative correlation between support and security purposes, and positive 
correlation between support and environmental uses, indicates sup-
port was lowest for security purposes and highest for environmen-
tal purposes. 
Figure 2. Illustration of distribution of sample re-
sponses (numbers indicate percent of sample) to sur-
vey questions concerning self-reported ideology.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of responses to questions as-
sessing public support or resistance by UAV purpose and year. There 
was a relatively bi-modal distribution of support ratings for security 
purposes in both 2014 and 2015, indicating public polarization. Rat-
ings of support for economic purposes were negatively skewed, result-
ing in more support on average than for security purposes. However, 
there appeared to be increasing polarization of responses in 2015 rel-
ative to 2014. That is, the percentage of those strongly resisting use of 
UAVs for economic purposes was greater than those expressing more 
moderate resistance in 2015. Finally, support ratings for use of UAVs 
Table 3. Pearson correlations between UAV support and each of our manipulated and 
measured variables. 
 2014  2015  Both Years  %Var 
Manipulated Variables 
Purposes 
Security	use		 −0.30***		 −0.27***		 −0.29***		 8.41%	
Environmental	use	 	0.24***		 0.31***		 0.27***		 7.29%	
Economic	use	 	0.06		 −0.04		 0.03		 0.09%	
End-User 
Business	(vs.	Government)		−0.11**		 −0.03		 −0.08*		 0.64%	
Autonomy 
Autonomous		 −0.03		 0.09		 0.01		 0.01%	
Manual		 −0.04		 −0.07		 −0.05		 0.25%	
Partially	Autonomous		 0.07		 −0.02		 0.04		 0.16%	
Terminology 
UAS	term		 −0.03		 −0.09		 −0.05		 0.25%	
UAV	term		 0.00		 0.02		 0.01		 0.01%	
Aerial	robot	term		 0.05		 0.01		 0.03		 0.09%	
Drone	term		 −0.02		 0.06		 0.01		 0.01%	
Framing 
Promotion	(vs.	prevention)		−0.12**		 −0.03		 −0.09*	 0.81%	
Measured Variables  
Female		 −0.03		 −0.02		 −0.02		 0.04%	
Age		 −0.01		 −0.08		 −0.03		 0.09%	
Ideology	(Conservativism)		−0.05		 0.07		 −0.01		 0.01%	
Issue	attitude		 0.17***		 0.24***		 0.20***		 4.00%	
Perceptions of end-users 
Trustworthiness		 0.50***		 0.55***		 0.52***		 27.04%	
Dis-trustworthiness		 −0.42***		 −0.48***		 −0.44***		 19.36%	
Competence		 0.39***		 0.47***		 0.42***		 17.64%	
Notes:	2014	N	=	576,	2015	N=301.	+p<0.10,	*p<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001.	%Var	is	the	
square of the Pearson correlation across both years and estimates the variance shared by 
the predictor and UAV support.    
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for environmental purposes were negatively skewed in 2014, and even 
more negatively skewed in 2015, resulting in the highest average lev-
els of support for environmental purposes. 
Among the other variables listed in Table 3, there were weaker but 
significant relationships with UAV support favoring prevention-fo-
cused framing and end use by the government over private business. 
Among the non-experimentally varied variables, as expected, there 
were relatively strong effects of end-user trustworthiness and of issue 
attitudes relevant to the scenario assigned to the participant. 
Figure 3. Distribution of rated support or resistance for the development and use 
of UAVs by purpose and year.  Note: Support was assessed by averaging two items 
(see Table 2) resulting in a mean between 1 and 7. Percentages of resistors and sup-
porters sum to less than 100 because a small percentage of persons’ mean scores 
were at exactly “4” (neutral) and thus were not counted as resistors or supporters.
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Multiple regression procedures provide a different measure of the 
importance of variables for predicting public support by identifying 
variables that account for independent variance above and beyond 
other variables. We first tested whether the effects of each of our 
variables depended on time (this is done by testing for statistical in-
teractions with time). These analyses indicated that the overall main 
effects did not change between 2014 and 2015. We therefore ignore 
the effect of time in most of our remaining analyses. Next, we exam-
ined a regression model in which the experimentally varied factors 
were entered on Step 1 and the measured variables were entered on 
Step 2. This allows us to see how important each variable is when it 
is competing with different combinations of other variables. Note that 
we standardized the measured predictor variables so that they would 
have a mean of zero (representing the average response) and a stan-
dard deviation of 1, in order to make results easier to interpret. Table 
4 shows the Step 1 and 2 models’ effects, which we next discuss in re-
lation to our research questions and hypotheses. 
Response to RQ1: U.S. Public Support is Impacted (Slightly) by 
Framing but not by Terminology 
Table 4 provides evidence supporting our hypothesis (H1) that termi-
nology will have no impact on public support in the U.S., but framing 
will have a significant impact favoring prevention framing. Consistent 
with prior research in social psychology, prevention framing in terms 
of protecting people from harm was associated with slightly more 
support (predicting a 0.23 point increase in support on the 7-point 
scale) compared to promotion framing. However, the overall vari-
ance accounted for by prevention or promotion framing (beyond that 
accounted for by other variables) was small (independently only ac-
counting for less than one-half percent of the total variance in sup-
port for UAVs). 
Note that, although terminology did not impact support for the 
technology, it did impact familiarity. A total of 92% of respondents 
across both years indicated “yes” they had heard of drones. Only 59% 
indicated they had heard of UAVs, 37% had heard of UASs, and 33% 
had heard of aerial robots. These results were similar across both 
years of the survey. 
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Response to RQ2: UAV Autonomy did not Impact UAV Support, 
Regardless of Purpose 
Table 4 results indicate that, as a main effect, autonomy of the UAVs 
does not appear to affect public support, although there was slightly 
less support for fully manual UAVs than partially autonomous UAVs 
in Step 1 of the model. To examine whether the effect of autonomy 
depends on the purpose of the UAVs, we conducted another regres-
sion analysis (not shown in Table 4) that tested for the interaction be-
tween the purpose and autonomy variables. The interaction was not 
statistically significant, which indicates that our hypothesis (H2) that 
Table 4. Results of hierarchical regression analyses predicting support with experimentally var-
ied and measured variables. 
  Step 1    Step 2 
 B  SE  Indep.  B  SE  Indep.  
   Variance    Variance
Step 1 
	(Constant)		 5.26***		 0.165		 	 5.15***		 0.138	
Security	use	(vs.	envir.)		 –1.36***		 0.133		 10.52%		 –1.15***		 0.112		 7.46%	
Economic	use	(vs.	envir.)		 –0.58***		 0.129		 2.08%		 –0.58***		 0.108		 2.05%	
Business	(vs.	Government)		 –0.26*		 0.106		 0.59%		 –0.30**		 0.088		 0.80%	
Autonomous	(vs.	partially)		 –0.04		 0.129		 0.01%		 0.02		 0.108		 0.00%	
Manual	(vs.	partially)	 	–0.22+		 0.129		 0.29%	 	–0.08		 0.108		 0.04%	
UAS	term	(vs.	drone)	 	–0.18		 0.149		 0.15%		 –0.09		 0.124		 0.04%	
UAV	term	(vs.	drone)	 	0.04		 0.149		 0.01%		 –0.04		 0.124		 0.01%	
Aerial	robot	(vs.	drone)		 0.09		 0.147		 0.04%		 0.12		 0.123		 0.06%	
Promotion	(vs.	prevention)		 –0.23*		 0.106		 0.48%		 –0.24**		 0.088		 0.52%	
Step 2a 
Trustworthiness	 	 	 	 	0.52***		 0.063		 4.69%	
Distrustworthiness		 	 	 	 –0.16*		 0.064		 0.45%	
Competence	 	 	 	 	0.27***		 0.059		 1.53%	
Issue	attitude	 	 	 	 	0.12*		 0.046		 0.46%	
Ideology	 	 	 	 	–0.01		 0.044		 0.00%	
F	 																			(9867)	=	13.79,	p	<	0.001		 															(14	862)	=	40.12,	p	<	0.001	
R2	 	0.13	 		 	 0.40	
+p<0.10,	*p<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001.	B	indicates	the	expected	change	in	support	relating	
to a 1-unit change in the predictor variable. Indep. Variance indicates the non-overlapping 
variance accounted for by the predictor above and beyond the variance accounted for by 
the other variables. 
a. Step 2 variables were transformed to z-scores such that 0 equals the mean response and the 
B value refers to the change in support for a 1 standard deviation increase in the predictor. 
Pytl ikZ ill ig  et  al .  in  IEEE  Technolo gy  and  So c iety  Magaz ine  (2018)       15
autonomy will have different effects on support depending on purpose, 
was not supported. Autonomy did not affect our respondents’ reported 
levels of support for UAVs, regardless of the purpose of the UAVs. 
Response to RQ3: Purpose and End-User Trustworthiness are the 
Most Important Predictors of Support 
The results presented in Table 4 further confirm the importance of 
UAV purpose for impacting support, as purpose accounts for about 
13% (11+2%) of the independent variance in the Step 1 model, while 
end user and framing each independently account for vastly less — 
only about one-half of one percent of the variance. Even when per-
ceptions of actor trustworthiness, issue attitude, and ideology are in-
cluded in the model in Step 2, UAV purposes continue to predict the 
most variance in public support, followed by perceptions of end-user 
trustworthiness. 
Taken together, our results support H3 that UAV purpose is among 
the most important predictors of UAV support. The B statistics in Ta-
ble 4 indicate, for example, controlling for all other variables (Step 2), 
use of UAVs for security purposes reduces support by 1.15 points on 
the 7-point scale, compared to environmental purposes. Using UAVs 
for economic (rather than environmental) purposes reduces support 
by 0.58 points. Additionally, our analyses find that our sample sup-
ported use by government more than by businesses (Table 4). Further, 
issue attitude, trustworthiness perceptions, and ideology do not com-
pletely explain the effects of purpose and end user. We know this be-
cause purpose and end user remain significant predictors of support 
even when those other variables are included in the model. 
Response to RQ4: Political Polarization can be Evoked, but is 
Small and the Pattern Changes over Time 
To examine whether certain conditions appeared to elicit politically 
polarized responses, and whether those conditions changed from 2014 
to 2015, we tested for differences in the effect of ideology depen-
dent on UAV purpose, actor, and year. Specifically, we examined the 
four-way interaction in a multiple regression while including all sub-
sumed interactions and main effects also in the model. Due to space 
constraints, the full model results are not presented but are available 
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from the first author. However, the four-way interaction was statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that political polarization of support 
(i.e., the relationship between ideology and support) changed depen-
dent upon UAV purpose, end user, and year. 
To clarify how political polarization varied, Table 5 shows the 
strength of the ideology-support relationship under different condi-
tions and Figure 4 illustrates the predicted mean support for UAVs 
dependent on the different factors. In Figure 4, the conditions under 
which significant ideology-support relationships were apparent are 
highlighted by the labeled bars. As shown in Table 5, our hypothesis 
(H4) was partially supported: polarization of support depended both 
on UAV purpose and end user. Specifically, ideology correlated with 
use of UAVs for environmental purposes by government in both 2014 
and 2015 (Table 5 respective rs = –0.27, –0.32, ps < 0.05), with the 
negative correlations indicating that conservatives were less support-
ive of UAVs than liberals under those conditions. In addition, Table 5 
and Figure 4 show that use of UAVs for security resulted in polariza-
tion such that conservatives were more supportive of that use in both 
2014 and 2015 — but the polarization was associated with different 
end users in 2014 (business) and 2015 (government). 
Table 5.	Effects	of	self-reported	ideology	on	support	under	different	experimentally	varied	con-
ditions	as	estimated	by	subsample	correlations	and	regression	coefficients	computed	under	dif-
ferent conditions. 
   2014     2015 
 Corr  %Var  B  %Var  Corr  %Var  B  %Var 
Government use for… 
Economic		 –0.09		 0.86%		 –0.14		 0.08%		 0.12		 1.44%	 0.18		 0.08%	
Security		 –0.02		 0.05%		 –0.04	 	0.00%		 0.29*		 8.18%		 0.48*		 0.55%	
Environment		 –0.27**		 7.02%		 –0.35*		 0.48%		 –0.32*		10.43%		 –0.35		 0.26%	
Business use for… 
Economic	 	–0.09		 0.77%		 –0.14		 0.08%		 0.15		 2.37%		 0.25		 0.16%	
Security		 0.24*		 5.71%		 0.40*		 0.64%		 –0.00		 0.00%		 –0.00		 0.00%	
Environment		 –0.18		 3.28%		 –0.29		 0.25%		 0.11		 1.25%		 0.15		 0.05%	
+p<0.10,	*p<0.05,	**p<0.01,	***p<0.001.	These	follow-ups	were	justified	by	a	significant	four-way	in-
teraction (R2-change=0.006,	F-change(2,853)	=	3.09,	p =	0.046)	indicating	that	the	strength	of	the	
ideology-support	relationship	varied	by	end-user,	purpose,	and	year	of	the	survey.	Corr=Pearson	
correlation.	%var	for	corr	indicates	the	total	variance	shared	by	self-reported	ideology	and	sup-
port.	%Var	for	B	indicates	the	independent	variance	accounted	for	based	on	regression	results.	
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Finally, although the results are partially supportive of our hypoth-
esis, we note that the effect of ideology (and thus political polariza-
tion) is generally small, only accounting for a fraction of a percent of 
the variance in public support for UAVs. This amount is not always 
statistically significant (see Table 5). In addition, the four-way and all 
three-way interactions became non-significant when issue attitudes 
and trustworthiness variables were included in the model. This sug-
gests that changes in polarization over time are due to the differences 
in issue attitudes and trustworthiness ratings between our 2014 and 
2015 samples. 
Discussion and Recommendations 
As stated by [30], “it is important to note that on one hand a new tech-
nology may bring about radical changes in society, while on the other 
hand the fate of that technology rests with the society in which it is 
being applied” [30, p. 783]. The present work investigating U.S. pub-
lic responses to UAV technologies is important, as it confirms and ex-
tends prior findings, thereby advancing understanding of U.S. public 
resistance to and support of UAVs, while also suggesting recommen-
dations for UAV developers, end users, and policy makers. 
Figure 4. Predicted UAV support by year, UAV purpose, UAV end-user, and ideology 
(computed at –1 and +1 standard deviation from the sample mean ideology). Notes: 
Bars representing the conditions under which there occurred significant relation-
ships between ideology and support are labeled. (a) Ideology-support correlation 
but not the ideology regression coefficient was significant in 2015.    
Pytl ikZ ill ig  et  al .  in  IEEE  Technolo gy  and  So c iety  Magaz ine  (2018)       18
For example, terminology had no effect on public support, consis-
tent with previous findings [9]. This may suggest UAV developers, pol-
icy makers, and users should not waste energy fighting for specific ter-
minology. Instead they should focus on the factors more important to 
the public, such as how, why, and by whom the UAVs will be used. It 
appears from these findings that members of the public translate be-
tween “drone” and other similar, but much less familiar, terms with-
out a measureable change in attitude. 
Second, the finding that prevention framing enhances support sug-
gests that members of the public are more moved by appeals related 
to reducing threats than enhancing benefits. This strategy could em-
phasize how UAVs can be used to prevent or decrease risks rather than 
increasing convenience. For example, if designing UAVs for prescribed 
fires, more public support may be garnered by emphasizing how use 
of the UAVs protects workers and the public from dangerous situa-
tions, rather than emphasizing efficiency or even safety gains. How-
ever, the weakness of the effect suggests framing may not be a very 
powerful strategy for impacting public support. 
Instead, focusing on valued purposes may be more powerful. Con-
sistent with prior findings, support for UAVs varied significantly by 
purpose. In our samples, the greatest support was found for UAVs 
used for environmental purposes and the least support was found 
for use for security purposes. Because we used a convenience sam-
ple, this specific pattern may or may not generalize to the U.S. as a 
whole. Nonetheless, the results indicate that various U.S. publics are 
likely paying much more attention to UAV purpose — rather than to 
factors like terminology or framing—when deciding how much they 
support UAVs. 
The public is also attending to who is using the UAVs and how much 
they trust them. Trustworthiness variables accounted for the second 
largest amount of variance after UAV purposes. Of the trustworthi-
ness variables, positive trustworthiness perception was the strongest 
predictor of support, followed by perceived competence, and then per-
ceived distrustworthiness (see Table 4). This indicates a relatively pos-
itive public context for UAVs (i.e., support is driven by reasons to trust 
users rather than by reasons to distrust) and could allow broader sup-
port for trusted entities, such as fire rescue personnel, to use UAVs. It 
also suggests that efforts to impact factors increasing perceived end-
user trustworthiness, such as training and licensing, may result in 
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greater support for their UAV uses. Regulatory or punitive responses 
aimed at reducing distrust in end users may be less effective. 
It is worth highlighting that drone autonomy was mostly unrelated 
to public support in our two samples. Furthermore, the direction of 
one observed marginal effect indicated a preference for autonomy. 
This finding contrasts with the evidence of public concern when it 
comes to autonomous cars [31] or autonomous military drones [32] 
and suggests the public is not uniformly against all autonomous tech-
nologies. While further study is needed, it is possible that the public 
will even favor autonomous (or at least partially autonomous) over 
manually controlled UAVs under certain conditions. 
Finally, political polarization was found to account for only a small 
amount of the variance in our data, even though we chose scenar-
ios in which political polarization might be especially likely to occur. 
This is encouraging given the negative impact political polarization 
has sometimes had on the trajectories of other technologies, as previ-
ously noted. The polarization that we did find provided evidence that 
the purposes and actors supported by individuals were affected by at-
titudes such as ideology, and changed over time. Conservatives sup-
ported security purposes more than liberals under some conditions, 
and liberals supported environmental uses more than conservatives. 
Our analyses further indicate, to some extent, this polarization could 
be attributed to differences in trust in different end users and in is-
sue attitudes. 
Taken together, our results suggest the importance of being re-
sponsive to the values of specific target audiences while developing 
UAVs and while communicating to different publics about UAV de-
velopment and usage. Such practices may reduce public resistance 
and, potentially, reactive legislation. One example of local ideologies 
impacting public acceptance and legislation is in the conservative, 
business-friendly state of Texas. There, a law was adopted to pre-
vent the use of UAVs by the public for observing business practices 
after a meat processing plant was caught dumping blood into a river 
by a private environmental activist [33]. As another example, in Cal-
ifornia, use of drones over private property has been limited in re-
sponse to privacy concerns over paparazzi flights near celebrity homes 
[34]. In both cases, locally important concerns have driven statewide 
legislation which may have unintended consequences on other UAV 
uses. By taking a proactive approach and responsively designing and 
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communicating about UAVs in locally acceptable ways, researchers 
and industry may be able to gain support prior to being threatened 
with legislative action. 
It is also important to consider public perceptions of end-user trust-
worthiness. Understanding which publics trust which end-users for 
different UAV uses is important, but may change over time and thus 
needs to be monitored and studied in greater detail. For example, 
there was a shift of politically polarized support for security purposes 
from the context of business users to government users from 2014 to 
2015. End user also had an overall impact on public support. Our par-
ticipants supported use by government over businesses, and this ef-
fect remained even when controlling for ideology and perceived trust-
worthiness of the end user (Table 4). This result, although deserving 
further investigation, is consistent with a recent survey of the Cana-
dian public which found that more of their survey respondents sup-
ported rather than opposed use of UAVs for data collection by gov-
ernment groups but the opposite was true for use of UAVs by private 
industry [18]. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While there are limitations associated with the use of a convenience 
sample such as ours, other social science research comparing results 
from MTurk samples with national samples, especially related to ef-
fects of political ideology, suggest similar results are found in both 
types of samples [35]. Nonetheless, future work should involve rep-
resentative national samples to increase generalizability to the U.S. 
as a whole. 
We have focused on predictors of public support and resistance to 
UAV technologies. Given the importance of predictors such as purpose 
and end-user trustworthiness, future work should focus on gaining a 
better understanding of the causes of those factors. Also, it was a bit 
surprising that issue attitude did not reduce the impacts of UAV pur-
pose when entered into the regression equation, and user trustwor-
thiness perceptions did not reduce the effect of end user (Table 4). 
This suggests that issue attitudes are not the reason (or at least not 
the sole reason) for purpose effects, and trustworthiness perceptions 
were not the reason for end-user effects. Future research is needed 
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to understand what other reasons may account for the differences. 
Although UAV autonomy did not appear to affect public support 
for UAVs under the studied conditions, we anticipate that other in-
formation about UAV characteristics may be important and worthy of 
further study. People may be more sensitive to whether video is be-
ing recorded or streamed to another device, what information is be-
ing collected and how it will be stored, and whether they trust that 
the end user will limit its use and distribution. Indeed, in one notable 
case illustrating such concerns, a father shot a drone that he felt was 
spying on his daughter. A judge dismissed the charges against him. 
Subsequently, a bill was proposed to criminalize drone harassment in 
Kentucky [36]. 
Future research should also investigate additional factors that may 
impact UAV support. Our models only accounted for 40% of the to-
tal variance. Other factors that may be important include trust in the 
technology itself. Studies such as [37] that have indicated inappro-
priate comfort with UAVs at close distances (<1.5 m) for interaction, 
which could indicate over-trust in technologies under some conditions. 
Incorporating perceptions of specific risks and benefits of the technol-
ogy, as well as specific characteristics of the platform, would likely in-
crease variance accounted for and allow a broader understanding of 
public support across contexts.   
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